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Abstract
The main purpose is to examine the relationship between corporate cash holding level 
and the prestige of the stock exchanges. And the other determinants in the listing re-
quirements impact on cash holding level will be indicated. The paper uses a sample 
of 577 listed firms excluding the financial institutions on the Vietnamese stock ex-
change over the period 2007–2015. The results show that the listed firms on the stock 
exchange with higher prestige hold larger amount of cash reserve and vice versa. The 
study shows that there is a statistically significant connection between cash holding 
and the listing requirements such as profitability, dividend and information disclosure. 
The findings have implications on the cash management of listed firms in the stock 
exchanges with dissimilar prestige.
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INTRODUCTION
The cash management has many challenges for all kinds of busi-
nesses (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). The free cash should be invested to 
earn more profit, while the firms must ensure the appropriate cash 
to meet the demand in future. Likewise, to manage the appropriate 
cash reserve level to meet the demand for future is a big question 
for administrators and researchers. Particularly, if the corporations 
do not have enough cash to cope with all the situations, these firms 
may suffer from losing affordability leading to reduction of the firm 
value (Martínez-Sola et al., 2013). The firms need cash in daily opera-
tions as an important source, because they sometimes need money 
to solve the financial problems immediately (Harford et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, holding too much cash causes the increase of carrying 
cost or opportunity cost, which can reduce the firm value (Dittmar et 
al., 2003). Furthermore, Harford et al. (2008) conclude that the excess 
cash will affect the future stock returns and the firm value. In addi-
tion, there is also the conflict between the manager and the share-
holders in decisions on the level of cash holding because of agency 
problems (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Thus, the primary task of the 
administrator is to find the right cash holding level which has be-
come one of interesting topics for studying.
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The previous studies focus on the other factors which affect the corporate cash holding such as firm size, 
net working capital, leverage, inventories, growth opportunities, financial distress, cash flow, and divi-
dend payment (Uyar & Kuzey, 2014; Ogundipe et al., 2012; Megginson et al., 2014). However, this paper 
examines the relationship between corporate cash holding and the prestige of stock exchange where the 
firms are listed. In most recent studies, the cash holding level can be explained by three theoretical mod-
els: trade-off theory (Myers, 1977), the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and agency theory 
(Jensen, 1986). According to the agency theory, Harford et al. (2008) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006) con-
firm that the level of corporate governance also impacts on the firm value with different levels of cash 
holding. Considering corporate governance is one of critical characteristics for the managers and the 
shareholders of firms, because they will affect the operating activities, as well as the cash management 
in the corporations (Kusnadi, 2011). Additionally, Turnbull (1997) defines that the internal corporate 
governance is the compensation policy, the board of directors, and the shareholders, while the external 
factors are the regulations, the market, government, audit and creditors. As stated in the information 
above, the stock exchange is considered as one of external corporate governance components which af-
fects the cash management. Moreover, the listing of firms in different stock exchanges has brought a lot 
benefits such as mitigating the information asymmetry to increase the protection for investor (La Porta 
et al., 2000). Similarly, Avramov et al. (2006) suggest that the cost of supplying the liquidity will be dif-
ferent on different stock exchanges. Therefore, the listed firms on those stock markets have different 
opportunities for raising their capital with dissimilar cost, as well as the different stock exchanges have 
different prestige, which has unlikely impact on the listed firms (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2010).
The hypothesis to test listed firms on the higher prestige of the stock exchange has kept higher level of 
corporate cash holding in Vietnamese context. It is the first study on the interaction between cash hold-
ing level and the listed firms on the different reputation of the stock exchange. This paper contributes 
to the overall interest about investigating the determinants which influence on corporate cash holding 
level. The most important contribution is to extend the literature in exploring the relationship between 
the prestige of stock exchange and corporate cash holding in Vietnamese context which represents as 
an emerging market and transition economy.
The rest of the paper is arranged by defining the model specifications to address the relevant empiri-
cal researches, methodology, analyzing the empirical results, and deriving a conclusion based on the 
findings.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
To know more about the relationship between the 
prestige of stock market and cash holding, firstly, 
the study should define the cash holding, as well as 
the prestige of stock exchange. Cash holding is the 
ratio between cash and cash equivalent out of total 
asset which is a tool to measure the importance of 
cash level in firm value, firm operations and firm 
performance (Martínez-Sola et al., 2013; Gill & 
Shah, 2012; Ogundipe et al., 2012). Secondly, the 
previous studies suggest that the prestige of stock 
market is one of factors of external corporate gov-
ernance (Turnbull, 1997). Particularly, there is the 
external corporate governance which influences 
the activities of the firms as raising the capital or 
manage cash holding level (Jensen, 1993). Harford 
et al. (2008) state that the managers keep larger 
cash level when the firms are better protected by 
better corporate governance.
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) confirm the 
prestige of stock market which influences the 
firm’s operation. The firms are listed or cross-list-
ed on prestigious stock exchange which get higher 
market performance (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2010). 
Moreover, there is a different impact between the 
market performance and cash reserve which de-
pend on the industry (Fresard, 2010). Likewise, 
the cross-listing in high reputation market lead to 
improve the corporate governance, lower capital 
cost which is a signal of firm value increase (Benos 
& Weisbach, 2004). The growth of firm value lead 
to better for financial health when they are listed 
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in different market with high prestige (Bianconi et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, the firms are cross-listing 
in different stock market with their prestige, which 
can bring more value, as well as ease to raise capi-
tal when they need (Lang et al., 2003). Clearly, the 
firms listed in the higher prestige stock exchange 
tend to hold less cash level, because they can ac-
cess the funds easier in the capital market (Opler 
et al., 1999). To support for it, this study examines 
the cash holding level of the listed firms on differ-
ent stock exchanges. The liquidity of listed firm is 
the ratio between volume of trading and the num-
ber of shares in which the trading volume is an 
important factor to evaluate the prestige of the 
stock exchange (Sarkissian & Schill, 2007). Thus, 
the liquidity is necessary to evaluate the prestige 
of stock exchange in the model.
Besides, the listed firms have to satisfy all the 
requirements of the stock market, which are dif-
ferent in every stock exchange, but the main 
standards focus on the number of shareholders, 
independent directors and board, profitability, li-
quidity, information disclosure, compensation 
committees (Carvajal & Elliott, 2007). In NYSE, 
the stock exchange concentrates on some impor-
tant provisions for listed firms such as the charter 
capital requirements, profitability and informa-
tion disclosure (from NYSE listing requirements). 
Consequently, when the firms fulfill all listing 
requirements, they are improving their prestige, 
as well as the creditability, which helps to make 
it easier for them to raise their capital (Doidge, 
2004). Likewise, based on the latest listing re-
quirements in stock exchange under the decision 
in 2015 from Ministry of Finance in Vietnam, 
charter capital, profitability (including profit and 
return on equity) and information disclosure are 
considered as important requirements which im-
pact on the listed firms, as well as the cash holding 
level. Firstly, capital requirements influence differ-
ently on the firms when they raise capital because 
of the different reactions of the market and inves-
tors (Slovin & Sushka, 1991). Moreover, the larger 
amount of charter capital may lead the firm easi-
er to raise their capital, so the firms do not need 
to hold too much cash. Secondly, Fresard (2010) 
expresses the connection between profitability of 
corporation and cash reserve level. In detail, the 
higher cash holding level can improve the return 
on equity or the performance of firms (Palazzo, 
2012). Nevertheless, Dittmar and Marhrt-Smith 
(2007) indicate that the market with weak cor-
porate governance do not take all advantages of 
keeping cash which can cause the decrease in firm 
profitability. These findings support the listing re-
quirements which can influence the cash holding 
level. Thirdly, there is the information disclosure 
requirement which reduces asymmetries of in-
formation between issuers and investors, clients 
and financial intermediaries, and between coun-
terparties (Carvajal & Elliott, 2007). Reducing the 
information asymmetry leads to less agency prob-
lem in order to decrease the cost for raising capital 
(Healy & Palepu, 2003). When the cost of raising 
capital is cheaper, the firms do not need to keep 
high level of cash.
Researchers also investigate other factors which 
impact on the cash holding level. The different 
ownership structure lead to dissimilar cash re-
serve level because of the assistances from po-
litical connections, the shareholder’s support or 
their management skills in order to take advan-
tages of keeping cash in operating the businesses 
(Yu, 2013). The different ownership structure can 
cause the agency cost due to the agency problems 
between shareholders and managers (agency the-
ory by Jensen, 1986). In other words, being state-
owned may cause the poor corporate governance 
mechanisms and agency problems which can im-
pact negatively on cash holding level (Megginson 
et al., 2014). Besides, Le and Buck (2011), Le and 
Chizema (2011) find out the positive connection 
between cash holding level and state ownership, 
while Borisova et al. (2012) state the negative as-
sociation between state-owned and cash holding. 
Institutional ownership besides state-owned af-
fects the capital management, as well as liquid-
ity of firms owing to institution’s experience 
(Lehmann & Weigand, 2000). In particular, the 
institutions tend to keep more money, because 
they have more chances in investment opportuni-
ties and more professional investors than the indi-
vidual investors (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).
Referring to the dividend factor, the dividend 
policy has influence on the cash holding plan. In 
detail, the higher dividend impacts negatively on 
cash reserve, because the firms can cut the divi-
dend when they need money (Ferreira & Vilela, 
2004). This result is similar to the pecking order 
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theory; the firms use the internal sources before 
using the external source to reduce the cost of bor-
rowing. Besides, the larger firms easily get exter-
nal capital with cheaper cost, so they do not need 
to hold too much cash (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; 
Uyar & Cemil, 2014; Saddour, 2006). Nevertheless, 
Megginson and Wei (2010) show that the larger 
firm should keep high level of cash to take all ad-
vantages of holding cash to invest in all the oppor-
tunities. Turning to the capital expenditure, Uyar 
and Kuzey (2014) show that capital expenditure is 
one of factors impacting negatively on cash hold-
ing level. Opler et al. (1999) finds a negative asso-
ciation between cash and capital expenditure. The 
growth in capital expenditure decreases the cash 
holding level (Dittmar et al., 2003; Chen, 2008). 
2. METHODOLOGY AND 
SELECTED VARIABLES
The market capitalization, the number of initial 
public offerings (IPO) and trading volume are the 
main elements to recognize the prestige of the 
stock exchange (Pagano et al., 2002; Zingales, 2006; 
Sarkissian & Schill, 2007). Cetorelli and Peristiani 
(2009, 2010) indicate the method to measure the 
prestige for stock exchanges. IPO activities are cho-
sen in the measurement for the prestige of stock ex-
changes which confirm that the United States mar-
ket has the highest ranking. In the paper of Cetorelli 
and Peristiani in 2010, the U.S. market maintained 
high prestige owing to market size, trading volume, 
IPO activities and the destination of listing firms. 
Based on the indicators, the paper evaluates the pres-
tige for Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock 
exchange as in the table below.
As we can see, the market capitalization, value 
of listing, trading volume, the number of shares 
and IPO activities in HOSE are higher than in 
HNX. Based on the information above, we can see 
that the stock exchange in Hochiminh (HOSE) 
has higher prestige in comparison with stock ex-
change in Hanoi (HNX) due to these indicators 
above (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2009, 2010). In or-
der to test the hypothesis, as well as to build the 
appropriate model, it is necessary to carry out a 
descriptive analysis of the variables. Moreover, the 
paper presents the data that were used. The regres-
sion method was used to examine the hypothesis.
2.1. Data
The data are from financial statements of listed 
firms on two largest stock exchange in Vietnam, 
Hochiminh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi 
Stock Exchange (HNX) from 2007 to 2015. In 
2007, many corporations were listed on the stock 
exchange with a lot of preferential exemptions 
which boosted the market. During that time, the 
stock exchange in Vietnam was developing very 
fast and the economy was also experiencing an 
unstable situation as the interest rate increased. 
Therefore, listed companies had an incentive to 
keep more cash in order to obtain all the opportu-
nities, as well as to avoid the high cost of borrow-
ing. Due to that, researchers of this study selected 
Vietnam stock exchange for the period 2007–2015. 
This research collected a sample of 577 listed firms 
(excluding financial institutions) on two stock ex-
changes (HOSE and HASTC). The data include fi-
nancial information at the end of the year from fi-
nancial reports including income statements, bal-
ance sheets, explanations for the financial state-
ment, and annual reports.
2.2. Variables
CASH is cash holding as a dependent variable in 
this paper. The cash holding has been defined as 
cash and cash equivalent which is divided by total 
Table 1. Hochiminh and Hanoi stock exchanges in Vietnam
Source: HOSE and HNX on May 15, 2017.
Criteria HOSE HNX
Market capitalization 74,270 mil USD 7,383 USD
Value of listing 23,408 bil USD 4,977 bil USD
Trading volume 159,098 mil USD 26,984 mil USD
The number of shares of IPO 52,127,862,030 shares 11,296,889,937 shares
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assets (Martínez-Sola et al., 2013; Ozkan & Ozkan, 
2004; Harford et al., 2008).
LISTED is a proxy of the prestige of the stock ex-
change. This variable is employed for the first time 
in order to test the prestige which can influence 
the cash holding. In Vietnamese stock exchange, 
there are two stock exchanges which have differ-
ent listing standards. Furthermore, the paper has 
already confirmed that HOSE has higher prestige 
than HNX. The LISTED variable uses as a proxy 
to find out whether the prestige of stock exchange 
can impact on the cash reserve level or not. 
STATE is represented as the percentage of a total 
number of shares that the government owns which 
influences the cash reserve level (Megginson et al., 
2014; Borisova et al., 2012).
INSTITUTIONAL is the proportion of shares 
owned by the institutions. Lehmann and Weigand 
(2000) argue that the companies have institution-
al ownership with more experience in the capital 
market, as well as managing the liquidity. The 
firms with higher institution-owned can obtain 
better opportunities when they keep more liquid-
ity assets.
SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Moreover, 
smaller firms have higher cash level which is 
in the line with the trade-off theory (Ferreira & 
Vilela, 2004).
PROFIT is stated as a proxy variable. It indicates 
if the company gets profit or not in the year. If 
the company gets more profit from operating ac-
tivities which create large cash flow, the firm can 
reduce the cash reserve (Kim et al., 1998). And 
the company decreases to mobilize capital when 
it has higher profit (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & 
Vilela, 2004). Nevertheless, some companies in-
tend to keep more cash, as they can get more prof-
it in growing periods (Megginson & Wei, 2010; 
Ogundipe et al., 2012). In this paper, it is used as 
a dummy variable to meet one of important re-
quirements for listed firms.
DIV variable is the payment that the firm pays out 
in a given year. In addition, Opler et al. (1999) and 
Meggison et al. (2014) point out the association be-
tween cash and dividend payment, so we expect 
the same direction in Vietnamese corporations. 
The dividend represents one of vital conditions for 
listed firms.
LIQUIDITY is a proxy variable for turnover rate 
which is measured by the trading volume and the 
outstanding number of shares. This ratio has a 
vital function in explaining the relation between 
liquidity and stock return (Datar et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, the stock return impacts on the cap-
ital investment, as well as the capacity for raising 
funds of firms (Titman et al., 2004). This variable 
is important for the listed firms to be aware of the 
ability in raising funds in the stock market.
MB is a dummy variable for information disclo-
sure in the stock market. This variable informs if 
the listed firms are following the listing require-
ment for announcing the information in the right 
time or not. In particularly, the information disclo-
sure affects strongly on the performance of firms, 
as well as the cost of capital when the listed firms 
want to raise their capital (Lambert et al., 2007).
Table 2. Summary of all variables
Variables Definitions
CASH The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets
LISTED A dummy variable with a value of 0 if the firms are listed in HOSE; number 1 for listed firms in HNX and number 2 for the listed firms that were cancelled
STATE State is the fraction of shares owned by the state
INSTITUTIONAL Institutional is the fraction of shares owned by the institutions
PROFIT A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the corporations have profit and 0 otherwise
SIZE Size is the logarithm of total assets
DIV Dividend is the payment for the shareholders in cash
LIQUIDITY Equal to the trading volume and the outstanding number of shares
ROE Return on equity is the ratio of equity by the net profit
MB 1 means the listed firms announce the information on time according to the regulations and otherwise is 0
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CAPEX is the capital expenditure which is the 
fund of firms to upgrade the physical assets. Opler 
et al. (1999) state that the determinants such as 
capital expenditure affect the cash holding level 
in the firms. Similarly, Lee and Lee (2009) believe 
that the capital expenditure has a connection with 
the cash reserve and we expect the same result in 
this paper. 
ROE is the ratio between net profit and equity of 
the firm. Abushammala and Jamalludin (2014) ex-
press that the corporation holds more cash which 
can be managed to solve problems in the business, 
while less cash holding may cause some troubles 
in earning profit. ROE is one of important require-
ments for listed firms.
2.3. Model
To estimate the right amount of cash holding lev-
el, the previous papers focus on the internal fac-
tors of the firm (Meggison et al., 2014; Ferreira & 
Vilela, 2004). In this case, we would like to test 
the prestige of stock exchange which impacts 
on the cash reserve level. Besides, two stock ex-
changes have some main requirements for listed 
firms, as well as the other factors which can influ-
ence on cash reserve level. Hence, there could be 
some variables which are present in both the cash 
holding and the listing requirements. These ele-
ments make the estimated results unreliable. To 
avoid this, we would like to use the IV process in 
which the listing requirements are employed and 
the cash holding is also determined by some of 
those conditions. The model used is presented in 
equation 1 below:
0 1 1
 .
it k k
Cash listed Xβ β β ε+ + +=  (1)
In the model 1, according to Martinez-Sola et al. 
(2013), cash is a dependent variable and is the quo-
tient of cash and cash equivalent out of total assets. 
According to Al-Najjar and Clark (2016), Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), the stock exchange prestige 
is an important factor which impacts on liquid-
ity management. Besides, the listed conditions on 
HOSE and HNX have different standards or regu-
lations which the listed firms should follow. In this 
model, we consider cash holding as the dependent 
variable and the prestige of stock exchanges as one 
of independent variables, which leads to employ-
ing the IV model.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Descriptive statistics
The Table 3 represents the summary of descriptive 
statistics of all variables are used in the models 
over the period 2007–2015. It provides a general 
view of all data. 
Table 3. Sample statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
CASH 3841 0.101 0.108 0.000 0.669
STATE 3841 24.41 23.42 0.000 79.91
INSTITUTIONAL 3841 8.143 12.30 0.000 49.01
LISTED 3841 0.495 0.528 0.000 2.000
PROFIT 3841 9.816 1.818 2.326 16.46
SIZE 3841 5.080 0.570 3.698 7.277
LIQUIDITY 3841 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.209
ROE 3841 0.139 0.104 0.000 0.601
DIV 3841 0.771 0.419 0.000 1.000
MB 3841 0.972 0.163 0.000 1.000
Notes: CASH is a cash equivalent out of total asset; LISTED is a dummy variable with a value of 0 if the firms are listed in 
HOSE, number 1 for listed firms in HNX and number 2 for the listed firms that were cancelled; STATE is the fraction of 
shares owned by the state; INSTITUTIONAL is the fraction of shares owned by the institutions; PROFIT is a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if the corporations have profit and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; DIV is the payment for 
the shareholders in cash; LIQUIDITY is equal to the trading volume and the outstanding number of shares; ROE is the ratio 
of equity by the net profit; MB is a dummy variable: 1 means the listed firms announce the information on time according to 
the regulations and otherwise is 0.
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The above table shows the description of the data, 
we can see that the cash to total assets of listed 
firms in Vietnam with the average value is around 
10% which is similar in previous papers (Opler et al., 
1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). However, this ratio is 
higher than the average cash holding in Spain with 
6.57% (Teruel & Solano, 2008), in United State with 
7.9% (Martínez-Sola et al., 2013), in Canada with 
3.87% (Gill & Shah, 2010), in Nigeria with 7.18% 
(Ogundipe et al., 2012). As the cash holding level in 
Vietnam stock exchange is higher in comparison 
with others due to the fact that the stock market 
had the bubble bursting during the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008. And borrowing money from the 
bank has become more difficult issue. Under these 
circumstances, the corporations should have strat-
egies for keeping cash reserves effectively.
3.2. Regression
Since there are some common characteristics that 
have an effect on cash, they also have influence on 
the listed conditions of firms, so that will be bi-
ased if we estimate the main model. To avoid this, 
as mentioned above, we employ three-stage least-
squares regression to analyze the impact of the 
prestige of stock exchange on the cash reserve lev-
el by using dummy variable LISTED. The results 
of model are given in Table 4 below.
The result shows that the higher prestige of the 
stock exchange leads the listed firms to hold high-
er level of cash reserve. This finding rejects the hy-
pothesis and the LISTED variable is not as expect-
ed. According to the literature review, the higher 
prestige of listing conditions in HOSE leads to 
lower cash reserve of the listed firms owing to 
the higher reputation which is easier for the firms 
to raise their capital with lower cost (Opler et al., 
1999). However, the results show that cash hold-
ing level has a positive connection with the list-
ed firms in HOSE. In particular, the listed firms 
in HOSE keep more cash than the listed firms in 
HNX which can be explained as follows. Likewise, 
the listed firms on higher prestige stock exchange 
have attracted more investment (Nahata, 2008).
Additionally, the larger size of firms which bring 
more investment opportunities for the firms should 
keep more cash in order to take all the advantages 
rather than using the external source. This outcome 
is similar to finding of Megginson and Wei (2010). In 
particular, the listed firms on HOSE has larger size 
than listed firms in HNX. Therefore, the listed firms 
in HOSE reserve higher cash level in comparison 
with the listed firms in HNX, because they want to 
obtain all opportunities in order to meet the needs 
in their business. Furthermore, the lending and bor-
rowing interest rates rose to 18% per year and the 
Table 4. Impact of the prestige of stock exchanges on the cash holding level
CASH Coef. Std. err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
STATE 0.000 0.000 5.42 0.000 .0002 .0005
LISTED –0.007 0.035 –2.05 0.040 –.0144 –.0003
INSTITUTIONAL 0.000 0.000 5.72 0.000 .0005 .0011
PROFIT 0.014 0.001 1.10 0.273 –.0011 .0039
LIQUIDITY –0.588 0.231 –2.54 0.001 –1.042 –.1341
ROE 0.240 0.019 12.34 0.000 .2026 .2792
MB 0.011 0.010 1.14 0.255 –.0084 .0318
_CONS 0.031 0.014 2.21 0.027 .0003 .0599
LISTED
SIZE 0.355 0.017 20.49 0.000 0.321 0.389
PROFIT 0.040 0.005 7.350 0.000 0.029 0.050
_CONS –1.705 0.067 –25.47 0.000 –1.837 –1.574
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R2 chi2 P-value
CASH 3841 7 0.103 0.0901 388.34 0.000
LISTED 3841 2 0.462 0.235 1186.2 0.000
Notes: CASH is equal cash and cash equivalent out of total asset; LISTED is a dummy variable with a value of 0 if the firms are 
listed in HOSE, number 1 for listed firms in HNX and number 2 for the listed firms that were cancelled; STATE is the frac-
tion of shares owned by the state; INSTITUTIONAL is the fraction of shares owned by the institutions; PROFIT is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if the corporations have profit and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; LIQUIDITY 
is equal to the trading volume and the outstanding number of shares; ROE is the ratio of equity by the net profit; MB is a 
dummy variable: 1 means the listed firms announce the information on time according to the regulations and otherwise is 0.
206
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
lending policies of banks were tightened. Therefore, 
borrowing money from the bank has become more 
difficult issue. Furthermore, the companies need 
capital, but the markets lack capital and money due 
to the fact that the mobilization channels have been 
limited. Under these circumstances, the corpora-
tions should have strategies for capital and cash re-
serves effectively. As a result, the listed firms can 
take part in the new investments chance which do 
not have to take risk or higher borrowing cost from 
external sources. This is similar with from pecking 
order and free cash flow theory and it is consistent 
with results from Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Uyar 
and Kuzey (2014). Equally, the listed corporations in 
Vietnam tend to keep more cash in order to avoid the 
high cost of external financing which is in the line 
with these finding.
One of other interesting finding is that the higher 
level of state ownership leads to hoard larger cash re-
serve in the listed firms. This is consistent with previ-
ous studies (Le & Buck, 2011; Le & Chizema, 2011). 
Moreover, the listed companies have a higher level 
of state ownership hold more cash reserve to prevent 
the risk or extra cost in the future which is in line 
with Yu (2013). Besides, the institutional ownership 
variable is also positive and significant with cash 
holding. This means that the companies increase the 
amount of cash reserve when the proportion of in-
stitutional ownership is higher. It is reasonable, be-
cause the institutions offer benefits from managerial 
skills and experience (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
Thus, the institution may have more investment op-
portunities base on their connections and experienc-
es. Next, the information disclosure is insignificant 
with the cash holding level, as the information dis-
closure is not important factor which have an influ-
ence on the cash reserve.
The experimental results provide the profit and re-
turn on equity which are the factors to determine the 
cash holding level. In detail, the profit is positively 
significant to the cash holding level which is used as 
the tool variable. This finding indicates that the list-
ed firms with higher profit keep more cash in order 
to obtain more opportunities in the growing period 
of the economy. This is similar to the results from 
Megginson and Wei (2010). And return on equity is 
significantly and positively connected with the cash 
holding level. The firm keep more cash in order to 
take all advantages in the investment which is simi-
lar with results of the previous papers (Megginson & 
Wei, 2010; Ogundipe et al., 2012). Besides, liquidity 
of listed shares in the stock exchange negatively im-
Table 5. Robust check for the impact of the prestige of stock exchanges on the cash holding level
CASH Coef. Std. err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
STATE 0.000 0.000 4.34 0.000 .0001 .0004
LISTED –0.006 0.035 –1.87 0.061 –.0137 –.0003
INSTITUTIONAL 0.000 0.000 5.49 0.000 .0005 .0011
PROFIT 0.000 0.001 0.56 0.574 –.0018 .0032
LIQUIDITY –0.476 0.232 –2.05 0.040 –.9318 –.0217
ROE 0.235 0.019 12.0 0.000 .1967 .0280
DIV 0.019 0.004 4.78 0.000 .0117 .2733
MB 0.014 0.010 1.39 0.166 –.0005 .0342
_CONS 0.022 0.014 1.57 0.117 –.0056 .0509
LISTED
SIZE 0.3554 0.017 20.62 0.000 .3216 .3892
PROFIT 0.0382 0.045 7.06 0.000 .0276 .0488
MB 0.3369 0.045 7.43 0.000 .0248 .4257
_CONS –2.0130 .078 –25.65 0.000 –2.167 –1.859
Equation Obs. Parms RMSE R2 chi2 P-value
CASH 3841 8 0.1030 0.095 413.0 0.000
LISTED 3841 3 0.4592 0.245 1256.9 0.000
Notes: CASH is equal cash and cash equivalent out of total asset; LISTED is a dummy variable with a value of 0 if the firms are 
listed in HOSE, number 1 for listed firms in HNX and number 2 for the listed firms that were cancelled; STATE is the frac-
tion of shares owned by the state; INSTITUTIONAL is the fraction of shares owned by the institutions; PROFIT is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if the corporations have profit and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; LIQUIDITY 
is equal to the trading volume and the outstanding number of shares; MB is a dummy variable: 1 means the listed firms an-
nounce the information on time according to the regulations and otherwise is 0; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; DIV is 
the payment for the shareholders in cash.
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pacts cash holding which is consistent with results 
from Opler et al. (1999). This finding posits that the 
listed firms can keep less cash when the liquidity of 
the share on the stock exchange is higher owing to 
the marketability of the share.
3.3. Robustness checks
We apply the robustness testing to check how stable 
the model is, as well as how stable the change in re-
sults is. In this part, we modify DIV and MB as a tool 
variable in order to test stability of the results.
The result points out that there is no change 
of signs in all variables. The variables STATE, 
INSTITUTIONAL, ROE and PROFIT are positive-
ly related to the cash holding level of listed firms on 
the stock exchange. These results in the robust test 
which is the same with the first one. The robust test 
confirms that the firms listed on the higher prestige 
stock exchange keep higher cash level. With the re-
gression result from the modification of the depen-
dent variables as dividend, the results of main vari-
able LISTED do not change which indicates strength 
or stability of the model. 
CONCLUSION
The paper explores the determinants that have an impact on stock exchange in transition economies. In 
detail, the study investigates that there is a relationship between cash holding level and the prestige of 
Vietnamese stock exchange from 2007 to 2015. For the analysis, the paper uses IV modeling to eliminate 
the endogeneity problem in the model. The results indicate that the higher prestige of stock exchange is 
linked with the higher level of cash holding. Conversely, the listed corporations in lower prestige market 
will hold less cash level. This finding could be a reference for listed firm to keep the right amount of cash 
in order to improve their profit, as well as firm value.
Reference to the variation in the variables are listing requirements as ROE and information disclosure 
which are positively connected with the cash holding level. The finding consistent with the prestige of 
stock exchange, listing requirements and cash reserve level. In particular, the higher prestige of stock 
exchange has more requirements keep more cash in order to get all investment opportunities. Moreover, 
they are listed in higher prestige stock exchange which improve their performance, as well as the higher 
chance for investment. Therefore, the firms are listed in different stock exchange that consider to keep 
the right amount of cash reserve. 
Besides, the study finds out that the state ownership and institutional ownership interact in the same 
way with cash holding due to the poor corporate governance and agency problems. Furthermore, the 
firms with state ownership or institutional ownership can take advantages of their political connections 
to get more investment opportunities. Thus, they may keep more cash to get all the opportunities, as 
well as prevent the risk of shortage funds. The dividend has the same trend with the cash holding level, 
the listed firms need to keep more cash in order to pay more dividend. Next, the liquidity of market neg-
atively correlates with the cash holding level. In this case, the higher liquidity of the listed firms that do 
not need to keep money due to the fact is that the firms can easily sell the shares to gain capital. Besides, 
the firms paying more for the board lead to reduced amount of cash holding. These investigations for 
the listed corporations in Vietnam should be considered as a vital reference to keep suitable the amount 
of cash which improves the firm performance.
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